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Introduction
• Goals of Presentation
• Overarching goal is to stimulate deeper discussion and analysis.
• Provide an overview of the rationale, basic structure of potential revised VMGs.
• Flag several policy economic, legal and policy issues involved in revising the VMGs.
• Caveat: Given time restrictions, this deck and the presentation are limited 
• See Appendix slides for further discussion of the economic analysis.
• Many of these issues are analyzed in more detail in these academic articles
• Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, YALE L.J. (May 2018)
• Salop & Culley, Revising the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, J. 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (2016)
• Riordan & Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, ANTITRUST L.J. (1996)
• Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Gain Power Over Price, YALE L.J. (1986)
• Salop & Culley, Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–July 2018 (posted on SSRN) (listing of agency challenges)
• Selected articles by others also are referenced in these academic articles.
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Overview of Initial Presentation
• Introduction: Why revise the vertical merger guidelines (VMGs)?
• Economic Analysis 
• Basic economic analysis of vertical merger potential harms and benefits.
• Why competitive effects of vertical and horizontal merger are not inherently different. 
• Policy Analysis 
• Why claimed efficiencies and other arguments do not justify more permissible policy presumptions 
for vertical mergers.
• Summary of proposed 3-step competitive effects analysis. 
• Appendices summarize some other VMG drafting issues
• Appendix A: Some further details of economic analysis.
• Appendix B: Some implications of AT&T/Time Warner opinion.
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Key Points 
• Enforcement should be focused on oligopoly markets 
• Harms and benefits from vertical and horizontal mergers are not inherently different in 
oligopoly markets
• Vertical merger form is “vertical” but harms are “horizontal”
• A stronger overarching procompetitive presumption for vertical mergers does not make sense 
in oligopoly markets
• Elimination of double marginalization and other efficiencies are neither inevitable nor necessarily 
merger-specific
• Only cognizable efficiencies (verifiable, merger-specific, procompetitive) should be credited, 
with the burden on the merging parties
• Revised Vertical Merger Guidelines should reflect these points
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Why Revise the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines
• 1984 VMGs are woefully out of date
• Do not reflect current economic learning 
• Do not reflect agency enforcement (consent decrees; FCC proceedings)
• 1984 VMGs do not provide useful guidance on current economics or merger policy to the 
various players
• Courts analyzing agency complaints
• Agency staff investigating mergers
• Businesses considering vertical mergers
• Outside attorneys counseling 
• Professional consensus exists for revision of 1984 VMGs
• AMC
• ABA Presidential Transition Reports (2012; 2016)
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Common Counter-Arguments 
Against Revising the VMGs
• Counterargument #1: Revision fails a cost-benefit analysis
• Cost is high because drafting would use up scarce resources
• Cost is high because the analysis is complex and difficult 
• Benefits are low because analysis is complicated, so devising useful guidance would be impossible
• Benefits are low because proper analysis is well-known 
• Benefits low because there is so little vertical merger enforcement (50+ consents in 20+ years)
• Benefits are low because there should not be any vertical merger enforcement
• Counterargument #2: Revised VMGs will lead to more enforcement by educating and 
empowering the agencies
• This will lead to more false positives (relative to the reduction in false negatives??)
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Economic Analysis and 
Policy Implications
7
Vertical Mergers Defined
• Horizontal merger: merging firms sell products or services that are substitutes for one another
• Two products are substitutes if the demand for one product increases as the price of the other product rises 
• Diversion ratio is positive
• Vertical merger: one merging firm is an actual or potential supplier or customer of the other merging 
firm 
• Complementary product merger: merging firms sell products or services that are complements for 
one another
• Two products are complements if the demand for one product decreases as the price of the other product rises
• Diversion ratio is negative
• Complementary product mergers raise similar issues and can be analyzed similarly to vertical mergers 
• A particular merger may be both horizontal and vertical:
• Substitutes for some consumers and complements for others
• Vertical in one market and horizontal in another
• Complementary product firms may be potential competitors into each other’s market
• One or both merging firms may already be vertically integrated
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Basic Economics (Competitive Effects) Issues
Competitive Harms
• Foreclosure
• Force 2-level entry or eliminate potential competition
• Input foreclosure
• Customer foreclosure
• Strategic misuse of rivals’ confidential information 
• Collusion/Coordination (Upstream or Downstream)
• Foreclosure leading to coordination 
• Disadvantaging disruptive buyer or maverick 
• Collusive information exchange
• Exercise of pre-existing market power 
• Evasion of regulation
• Facilitation of harmful price discrimination 
Enforcement should be focused on oligopoly markets
Competitive Benefits
• Coordination in production, design, innovation from 
information transfer/exchange
• Cost reductions
• Quality improvements
• Faster/better innovation
• Harmonization of incentives in vertical and 
complementary mergers
• Elimination of free riding (including investment)
• Elimination of double marginalization (“EDM”)
• Creation of a maverick
Only cognizable efficiencies should be credited (i.e., verifiable; 
merger-specific; procompetitive)
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Overall effect on consumers compares 
likelihood and magnitudes of harms to 
cognizable efficiency benefits, based on factual analysis
Key Policy Issues
• This presentation focuses primarily on the policy issues that may arise in drafting VMGs
• Economic theories of harms and benefits appear less controversial 
• Appendix A provides details of economic theories and questions regarding merger-specificity
• Salop & Culley JAE article lists potentially probative evidence to evaluate these various theories
• Key policy questions
• Are vertical mergers so less concerning than horizontal mergers that the legal and policy analysis should differ 
substantially? 
• Should vertical mergers be treated systematically more permissively than horizontal mergers? If so, how?
• My conclusions and recommendations
• Problematic vertical mergers are “vertical,” but the harms are “horizontal”
• A stronger overarching procompetitive presumption for vertical mergers does not make sense in 
oligopoly markets where vertical merger enforcement would be focused (same as horizontal mergers)
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Vertical and Horizontal Merger Competitive 
Issues are Not Inherently Different: Summary 
• Foreclosure harms from vertical mergers are similar and not “less inherent” than unilateral harms from horizontal mergers. 
• In the pre-merger market, the upstream merging firm that supplies a downstream firm is inherently an “indirect competitor” of the future 
downstream merging firm. That indirect competition is eliminated by merger. This unilateral effect is exactly parallel to the unilateral 
effect from a horizontal merger.
• In fact, the vertical GUPPI is similar to the horizontal GUPPI  (though reduced by the upstream pass-thru rate and increased with a higher  
diversion ratio if foreclosure targets multiple downstream rivals). 
• Vertical integration (including combining complements) is common. But so is horizontal integration, combining substitutes, as 
result of economies of scope & scale.
• Many firms sell multiple substitute products (e.g., Coke and Sprite; premium and value products).
• Partnerships among competitors and horizontal mergers are common. 
• Vertical merger efficiencies are not inevitable.  Vertical integration is common. But vertical non-integration also is common.
• Coca Cola has not merged with McDonalds; Pepsi acquisition of KFC& Pizza Hut failed.
• Sony Betamax was beaten out by JVC’s VHS open standard. 
• Fox bought but then sold DirecTV and Time Warner and TCI/Liberty separated distribution and content.
• Alcoa has broken up into separate upstream and downstream firms (Alcoa and Arconic). 
• The key issue is not about whether there are efficiencies, but rather whether the efficiencies are merger-specific.
• Efficiencies often can be achieved without merger: i.e., vertical integration “by contract.”
• The burden to show merger-specific efficiencies should be placed on the merging firms, just like they are for horizontal mergers and 
other antitrust areas.
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Vertical and Horizontal Merger Competitive Concerns 
are Not Inherently Different: Unilateral Effects
• Vertical merger harms are involve “horizontal” effects 
(i.e., reduce horizontal competition)
• Upward pricing pressure (UPP) analysis is similar
• Horizontal mergers have UPP from the unilateral incentive to raise price to drive incremental sales to the merger 
partner.  
• Vertical mergers have UPP from the upstream firm (U) having a unilateral incentive to drive incremental sales to 
its merger partner (D) by raising the price it charges to downstream rivals (R).
Vertical GUPPIR = Div Ratio(R,D) x Margin (D) x Cost Pass-Thru Rate (U)
Diversion Ratio rises if more rivals are targeted simultaneously
Vertically merging firms are “indirect” competitors 
• See diagrams on next slides
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Consumers
Pre-merger Indirect 
Competition Between U and D
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Upstream 
Merging Firm (U)
Downstream 
Rival (R))
Downstream 
Merging Firm (D)
Firm U “indirectly” competes with Firm D 
by supplying inputs to Firm R
Consumers
Merger of U & D plus Foreclosure Reduces
Indirect Competition between U and D:
Forces Involuntary Coordination by R
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Upstream 
Merging Firm (U)
Downstream 
Rival (R))
Downstream 
Merging Firm (D)
Upstream Firm (U): 
-- merges with Downstream Firm (D)
-- raises the wholesale price to 
Downstream Rival (R)
• By supplying cost-effective inputs to a downstream rival (call it R) of another 
downstream firm (call it D) in the pre-merger market, an upstream supplier (call it U)
“supports competition” by this downstream rival (R) with the other downstream firm 
(D).  
• Thus, the input supplier (U) effectively is an “indirect competitor” of the other 
firm (D).  
• If the supplier (U) and other firm (D) then merge, and the supplier (U) raises price to 
the rival (R ), then this “indirect competition” can be reduced or eliminated.  
• Raising the costs of the rival (R) may essentially coerce it involuntarily to coordinate 
with the merging downstream firm (D).
“Indirect Competition” Characteristic:
Summary
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Vertical and Horizontal Merger Competitive 
Concerns are Not Inherently Different: 
Impact on Mavericks
• Horizontal mergers can eliminate a maverick or change its incentives.
• Vertical merger effects on mavericks can be analogous in several ways:
• If the upstream merging firm (U) is a “maverick” that prevents coordination among upstream input 
competitors, a merger between downstream firm (D) and upstream firm (U) could eliminate this 
incentive and lead to a higher likelihood of coordination in the upstream market.
• If merging downstream firm (D) is a “disruptive buyer” that prevents coordination among upstream 
input competitors, a merger between this merging downstream firm (D) and one of the upstream 
firms could eliminate this incentive and lead to a higher likelihood of coordination in the upstream 
market.
• Downstream merging firm would be protected from input price increases.
• The upstream merging firm can be incented by the merger to exclude or raise price to an 
unintegrated downstream maverick in order to facilitate downstream coordination that will benefit 
the downstream merging firm.
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Vertical and Horizontal Merger Competitive Concerns 
are Not Inherently Different: Coordination
• Horizontal mergers can facilitate horizontal coordination in various 
ways.
• Vertical mergers also can lead to horizontal coordination:
• Merger can facilitate coordination by, for example, raising costs of smaller 
rivals. 
• Merger can enable reciprocal pricing or licensing coordination by 
integrated firms.
• Merger can change incentives of a pre-merger maverick or disruptive firm.
• Merger can lead to horizontal information exchange.
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Potential Efficiencies Do Not Call for a 
Different Approach than Horizontal Mergers 
• Both horizontal and vertical mergers may lead to merger-specific efficiencies
• Many firms produce multiple substitutes from economies of scope, information sharing, and 
reputational goodwill benefits.
• Claimed justifications for a differential approach for enforcement in oligopoly markets are 
invalid
• Old Chicago-school economic theory presumptions are not economically correct.
• Econometric evidence does not support a procompetitive presumption for vertical mergers in 
oligopoly markets.
• Complaints by downstream competitors do not justify a procompetitive presumption. 
• Sylvania and Leegin do not mandate or support a procompetitive presumption for vertical mergers 
in oligopoly markets.
• Recognition and acceptance of these points also can avoid “confirmation bias” by merger 
analysts and courts.
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Old Borkian Claims Do Not Support 
a Stronger Procompetitive Presumption
• “Foreclosure” is not illusory, and is not simply a neutral rearrangement of supplier-customer 
relationships.
• Markets do not inevitably or quickly self-correct, especially if the conduct raises the costs of 
rivals or erects barriers to entry.
• The “single monopoly profit” theory only applies to limited, extreme market structures.
• Elimination of double marginalization (EDM) and other efficiencies are not inevitable and 
may not be merger-specific.
• See Salop (YLJ) for details.
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EDM and Other Efficiencies are Neither 
Inevitable nor Necessarily Merger-Specific
• Efficiencies are not inevitable.  Many firms are not vertically integrated, despite imperfect competition at 
both levels.
• Coase’s door swings both ways: Efficiencies often can be achieved by vertical contracts, without the 
potential anticompetitive harms from merger.  
• In that vertical restraints are characterized as “just” vertical integration “by contract,” then claimed efficiencies in 
problematical mergers might be achieved with non-merger contracts that do not raise the same anticompetitive 
concerns.  
• EDM may not be merger-specific
• EDM might be achieved with non-linear prices or quantity-forcing contracts.
• Note also that EDM incentives are mitigated by the “opportunity cost” of shifting more profitable sales that upstream 
merging firm makes to downstream rivals and impact of lowering prices to existing customers. (See Moresi/Salop; 
Rogerson)
• Failure to achieve efficiencies pre-merger does not prove merger-specificity
• Failure could suggest that they also would not be achieved post-merger. 
• A general claim of “bargaining frictions” is not sufficient evidence of merger-specificity.
• Merging parties must provide rigorous explanation, identifying specific pre-merger impediments that are not 
themselves anticompetitive. 
• They must explain why impediments solved by the merger.
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Econometric Evidence Does Not Support 
a Stronger Procompetitive Presumption
• See econometric studies listed in LaFontaine & Slade; Cooper et al; Salop (YLJ).
• Estimated competitive effects are mixed.
• In addition, various caveats apply to evaluation of econometric studies:
• Selection bias towards no effect because antitrust deters the most worrisome mergers.
• Many studies involve competitive markets where problems are unlikely. 
• Some studies are not capable of distinguishing RRC from EDM; some studies find neither 
effect.
• Sample of studies (industries) is not random – limited by data availability.
• Studies of intrabrand restraints are not good predictors of impact of interbrand effects of 
vertical mergers in oligopoly markets.
• Stock market event studies are subject to fundamental criticisms.
• Some studies have data or econometric issues.
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Complaints By Downstream Competitors Do Not 
Support a Stronger Procompetitive Presumption
• Chicago-school inference that complaints by competitors imply that horizontal merger 
is procompetitive.
• If merger will reduce costs, then competitors are harmed and will complain.
• If merger will facilitate coordination, then competitors benefit and will not complain.
• Inference fails if horizontal or vertical merger will raise rivals’ costs.
• Now interests of consumers and interests of competitors are aligned.
• A view that firms tilt testimony towards self-interest would lead to equal skepticism of 
testimony by merging firms.
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Sylvania and Leegin Do Not Mandate or Support 
a Stronger Procompetitive Presumption
• Both cases involve a small manufacturer’s intrabrand vertical restraints.
• e.g., Territorial restrictions; RPM
• But vertical mergers are more like interbrand restraints, which are more concerning.
• e.g., Exclusive dealing
• Leegin did not adopt an overarching procompetitive presumption.
• Leegin adopted the conventional rule of reason, which corresponds to a “relatively neutral” 
competitive presumption. 
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Legal Context and Impact 
on VMG Policy
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VMGs in the Shadow of the Law
• Issue: Should VMGs simply describe agency analysis, irrespective of merger law?
• HMGs do not make legal judgments, but they follow merger law. 
• The VMGs (as prosecutorial judgments) also must be consistent with basic merger law.
• Legal framework choices
• Autolite, Brown Shoe, and Freuhauf;
• Horizontal merger law (as DOJ recommended in AT&T/TW);
• Judge Leon’s 3-step legal approach in AT&T/TW ;
• Wait to see how DC Circuit sets out the law in AT&T/TW.
• Likely DC Circuit approach in AT&T/Time Warner
• Follow the same basic 3-step burden-shifting structure used in Baker Hughes, subsequent horizontal merger 
cases, and Judge Leon in AT&T/TW.
• The question is the plaintiff’s burden in light of Section 7.
• My proposal: Require the same structure and standards as for horizontal mergers.
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Application of Basic Merger Law
• In Baker Hughes, the DC Circuit set out a 3-step burden-shifting approach for horizontal mergers (with 
sliding scale extended in Heinz):
• Step 1: Agency establishes sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of harm (ignoring potential 
efficiency benefits); if so, …. 
• Step 2: Burden shifts to merging firms to rebut by showing no harm; or by producing sufficient evidence of 
cognizable efficiency benefits; if so, … 
• Step 3: Burden shifts back to agency to establish overall anticompetitive effects.
• Standard of proof takes into account the role of “incipiency” in Section 7 standards:
• Prediction 
• Probability, not certainty 
• Prominence of “false negatives” (including under-deterrence) concerns
• Philadelphia Nat’l Bank: Application of anticompetitive structural presumption to replace or supplement case-
specific evidence in Step 1.
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Possible Policy Criticisms of Applying the 
Same 3-Step Approach as for Horizontal Mergers
“Vertical mergers in oligopoly markets 
should be presumed to be highly efficient 
and procompetitive”… So, 
“Plaintiff should face more demanding standard of 
proof.” 
“Plaintiff should bear burden to disprove 
efficiencies.”
“Efficiencies should be conclusively presumed to be 
merger-specific.”
But … 
• These attempts to distinguish vertical and 
horizontal mergers in oligopoly market are not 
supported by rigorous analysis (as discussed 
earlier).
“Unlike horizontal mergers, there is no PNB 
structural presumption” … So,
“Plaintiff should bear all burdens”
But…
• The 3-step decision process is used throughout 
antitrust without a structural presumption, 
because there are other ways to establish a prima 
facie case….
• Presumptions can be based on factors other than 
the increase in market concentration.
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DOJ PCOL in AT&T/TW 
Proposes The Following Legal Standards
• Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes mergers that may substantially lessen competition.
• To “arrest restraints of trade in their incipiency,” Section 7 proscribes any merger creating a “reasonable probability” of harm. 
• Harm from the merger need not happen immediately for Section 7 to apply. 
• A Section 7 plaintiff does not need to quantify the potential harm.
• Section 7 does not contain an exemption for “minor” price increases. 
• The same Section 7 standards apply to horizontal and vertical mergers. 
• Courts analyze Section 7 claims through a burden-shifting framework.
• A vertical merger may substantially lessen competition by giving the merged firm the incentive and ability to disadvantage its rivals.
• When a vertical merger enables the merged firm to raise its rivals’ costs, competition is lessened substantially. 
• When a vertical merger enables the merged firm to encumber its rivals’ access to a unique resource, competition is lessened 
substantially.
• When a vertical merger enables the merged firm to impede innovation, either unilaterally or through coordination, competition is lessened 
substantially. 
• Defendants may rebut a prima facie case only by showing that competitive harm is not “reasonably probable.”
• Entry must be timely, likely, and sufficient to prevent competitive harm. 
• Claimed efficiencies (which arguably cannot ever save a merger) must withstand “rigorous analysis.” 
• Defendants bear the burden of their efficiencies defense. 
• Efficiencies must be reasonably verifiable, merger-specific, and likely to benefit consumers in the affected markets, and must offset 
the harms of the merger. 
• The Court cannot credit Defendants’ purported efficiencies. 
• A unilateral behavioral promise, such as an arbitration offer, cannot rebut a prima facie case.
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Further Analysis of 3-Step 
Decision Process
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Step 1: Establishing Prima Facie Case
• Step 1 prima facie case satisfied with evidence (including applicable presumptions):
• Evidence of oligopoly markets with entry barriers.
• Economic and documentary evidence of likely consumer harm.
• “Reasonable probability” as my proposed evidentiary standard:
• “Incipiency” concern suggests a less demanding standard.
• Step 1 is implemented under the interim assumption of no efficiencies, which reduces the burden. 
• This also suggests that (precise, if any) quantification should not be required.
• Query: Since zero efficiencies are assumed, is it sufficient to show harm to downstream competitors in Step 1?
• VMGs might formulate a safe harbor (as do HMGs):
• E.g., Both upstream and downstream markets are unconcentrated.
• Note: This test should require both standard and modified HHIs (not including the merging firms) also be unconcentrated. 
• VMGs might formulate types of anticompetitive presumptions, such as the following…
• One merging firm is dominant in its market and other merging firm is a unique (or critical?) entry sponsor; or  
• Upstream merging firm has (significant) market power in a concentrated input market and supplies a critical input to the 
competitors of the downstream merging firm; or  
• Downstream market is highly concentrated and upstream merging firm is a maverick that supplies a critical input; or
• Upstream market is highly concentrated and downstream merging firm is a disruptive buyer or accesses sensitive competitive 
information from upstream firms; or
• Vertical merger structure would permit evasion of price regulation.
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Step 2A: Structural Rebuttal
• Potential rebuttal based on various structural and other factors (even aside from efficiencies) 
that would prevent competitive harm
• Follow Baker-Hughes, Heinz and HMGs
• Factors can include the following …
• Substantial input substitution 
• Easy entry or repositioning
• Sufficient competition from non-targeted rivals
• Countervailing buyer power
• Failing firm
• Relevant natural experiment evidence
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Step 2B: Efficiency Rebuttal
• Burden on defendant to produce reasonable evidence of “cognizable” efficiencies 
• Verifiable; Merger-specific; not flowing from anticompetitive conduct or effects 
• Burden to prove merger-specificity typically placed on defendants
• Firms have superior access to information on claimed efficiencies
• Merger-specificity requirement also is appropriate for vertical mergers
• Efficiencies often can be achieved by contract, without the potential anticompetitive harms from merger 
(Coase)
• Elimination of double marginalization (EDM) might be achieved with non-linear price or quantity-forcing 
contracts
• Failure to achieve efficiencies pre-merger does not prove merger-specificity, but instead could suggest 
low benefits or inefficient management 
• A general claim of “bargaining frictions” is not sufficient evidence 
• Verifiability requirement is also appropriate
• Efficiency may be difficult to achieve in light of differential knowledge
• As noted earlier, EDM incentives are mitigated by “opportunity costs” 
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Step 3: Ultimate Burden of Persuasion
• Plaintiff must show “reasonable probability” of anticompetitive effects 
• Section 7 (“may substantially lessen competition”)
• “Reasonable probability” evidentiary standard flows from “incipiency” concerns in statute
• “Overall” anticompetitive impact on consumers
• “Overall” means harms sufficient to outweigh competitive benefits to consumers from 
merger-specific efficiencies
• But this still raises two possibly contentious issues
• What if there is harm to customers of downstream rivals (from RRC) but benefits to 
customers of merging firms (from efficiencies)? 
• What if there is harm to direct customers of the upstream merging firm, who are 
competitors of the downstream merging firm.  Must harm to the downstream rivals also 
be established?
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Is Injury to a Subset of Customers of 
Downstream Firms Sufficient for Liability?
• Suppose harm only to the customers of foreclosed downstream rivals 
• Suppose in a differentiated product market it is found that …
• RRC: Input foreclosure leads downstream rivals to raise their prices 
• Efficiencies: Merger-specific EDM leads merging firm to reduce its downstream price
• Example: Coke & Pepsi bottler mergers has these estimated effects(Luco & Marshal)
• Finding liability here is consistent with HMGs analysis of harm in targeted buyer 
markets
• In horizontal mergers, balancing benefits in one market to offset anticompetitive effects in another market is not 
permitted (i.e., PNB)
• Aggregating effects involve difficult interpersonal comparisons 
because no compensation
• Issue for Discussion: Should VMGs contain some limited balancing under 
prosecutorial discretion, as in HMGs “inextricably linked” footnote
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Is Injury to Downstream Rivals Sufficient for Liability?
• Must the plaintiff show harm to customers of the downstream firms? 
• Or, is it sufficient to show harm to the direct purchasers of the upstream firm, who are also the (downstream) 
competitors of the merged firm?
• In AT&T/TW, DOJ focused on injury to customers of downstream firms, but proposed that harm to the 
downstream competitors is sufficient for liability
• Conflicting overarching antitrust views
• Downstream firms are the “direct purchasers” of the upstream merging firm; and “direct purchasers” are the 
usual antitrust focus
• But, it is said that merger law protects “competition, not competitors”
• Issues for discussion
• Suppose the merger likely would facilitate coordination among upstream firms. Would it be sufficient in this 
situation merely to show harm to the unintegrated downstream firms? 
• Suppose foreclosure harms the unintegrated downstream competitors and there are zero merger-specific 
efficiencies.  Then harm to the competitors might lead to a presumption of harm to the customers of the 
downstream firms.  (But not a certainty: what if consumers would switch to non-foreclosed rivals or other 
products?)
• What if there are merger-specific efficiencies?  Should effects on downstream consumers be paramount? 
Or, should harm to downstream rivals be balanced against downstream consumer benefits? 
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Remedy Formulation
Issue for Discussion: Should VMGs discuss remedies?
If so, …
• Structural remedies are preferred
• Behavioral remedies can be problematic
• Difficult to monitor and enforce
• Often fail to foresee future anticompetitive concerns or conduct
• But, better than clearing anticompetitive mergers
• Consent decrees can be strengthened
• Include look-backs and potential for revisions if decree fails to preserve competition 
• Or, “just say no.”  
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• Agency Process 
• New VMGs are needed.
• New VMGs are doable. 
• The DOJ’s AT&T/TW case began a useful process. 
• The DOJ and FTC do not need to wait for AT&T/TW opinion to begin work.
• Analytic Framework
• The Baker Hughes/Heinz 3-step analysis can be adapted and applied to vertical mergers.
• The economic categories and issues can be described and analyzed, and probative evidence can identified. 
• Recommended Policy Approach
• Vertical mergers in oligopoly markets do not deserve a differential presumption or inherently more permissive 
standards than horizontal mergers.
• Both deserve rigorous, yet balanced, agency analysis. 
• Analysis and interpretation should avoid “confirmation bias.”
Conclusions
37
Appendix A:
Basic and Illustrative 
Economic Analysis
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Forcing 2-Level Entry
Hypo Merger (circa 2000) : Microsoft 
(OS)– Google (Search)
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Refuse to enter or 
sponsor entry at 
other level
Maintain 
monopoly prices 
at both levels
Potential OS Entrant 
(Google - Android?)Microsoft (OS)
Google 
(Search) Potential Search Entrant (Microsoft - Bing?)
Consumers
Input Foreclosure
• Probably the most common claim
• Several ways to “raise rivals’ costs”
• Refusing to sell input (“withholding;” “total foreclosure”)
• Unilaterally raising price 
• Increased bargaining leverage, leading to higher negotiated price
• Variant: Reducing/degrading quality; withholding critical information
• Potential harms at 2 levels 
• Harm to “direct customers” (i.e., downstream rivals)
• Harm to “consumers” (i.e., customers of downstream firms)
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Consumers
Input Foreclosure: Basic Economic Logic
41
Input Price 
Increase
Induced Price 
Increase & Output 
DecreaseEnabled Firm 
Output & Price 
Increase; market 
output falls 
Resulting 
Diversion
Of Sales
Upstream 
Merging Firm
Downstream 
Merging Firm
Foreclosed Rivals
Non-Merging
Upstream Substitutes
Potential 
Entrants
Non-Foreclosed Rivals
(including subsitute products)
Input Foreclosure:
Basic Competitive Harm Analysis
• Upstream (Input) Market: Raising Rivals’ Costs
• Will firm have power/incentive to raise input price or refuse to sell to targeted rival(s)?
• Do rivals have cost-effective substitutes (including backward integration or entry)?
• If input is distribution, can targeted firm engage in cost-effective “direct” distribution?
• Will substitute input providers have power/incentive to raise prices, unilaterally or thru coordination? 
• Note: This “multi-lateral” competitive response is typically overlooked in unilateral analyses of input foreclosure 
• Will rivals’ costs rise materially?
• Downstream (Output) Market: Power Over Price
• Will merging firm have power/incentive to raise prices to consumers, either unilaterally or thru coordination?
• Is a targeted rival a downstream maverick or disruptive buyer?
• Do consumers have sufficient cost-effective substitutes – other products or non-targeted rivals? Will they 
compete or coordinate?
• Are there other vertically integrated  competitors? Will they compete or coordinate?
Note: Distribution services (distributors) are an input.
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Consumers
Reciprocal Coordination Equilibrium
Multiple Vertical Mergers with Reciprocal High Prices and MFNs 
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Reciprocal high 
input prices lead to 
high output prices
MFNs deter 
cheating
Raise wholesale 
prices to entrants to 
increase BTE
NBCU
Comcast DirecTV; ATT UVerse
Time Warner
(Turner/HBO_ Disney(ESPN, ABC)
Charter or Cox
Customer Foreclosure 
Example: Hospital/Anesthesia Group Merger
44
EJH denies Privileges
Dr. H falls below 
MVS and exits Roux raises prices 
and increases 
market share
Roux and Assoc
East Jefferson 
Hospital  
Dr. Hyde 
Outpatient Surgical Clinics
Other potential 
clients of Dr. Hyde
Customer Foreclosure:
Competitive Harm Analysis
• Reducing Rivals’ Revenues (Customer Market)
• Will targeted rival(s) lose significant revenues from loss of merging (downstream) firm as a 
customer?
• What fraction of rivals’ sales are accounted for by merging firm? (foreclosure rate)
• Do targeted rival(s) have ability/incentives to replace lost sales?
• Are there sufficient other customers/?
• Power Over Price (Input Market)
• Will merging input supplier gain the power/incentive to raise or maintain supra-competitive prices?
• Will targeted rival(s) fall below MVS and exit ?
• Will targeted rival(s) have higher marginal costs?
• Will targeted rival(s) be marginalized into niche position by inability to grow?  Will they reduce 
investment? 
• Will successful customer foreclosure lead to or reinforce input foreclosure?
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Input plus Customer Foreclosure 
Example: Hospital/Anesthesia Group Merger
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EJH denies privileges; 
Hyde exits
Rival hospitals and 
clinics have higher 
costs, allowing 
EJH to raise prices 
and increase 
market share
Roux and Assoc
East Jefferson 
Hospital  Outpatient Clinics
Insurers
West Jefferson 
Hospital  
Jekyll and AssocDr. Hyde
Jekyll raises prices in 
response to Hyde exit 
Examples of Other Coordination Theories
• Collusive Information Exchange
• In 1990s, if a drug company (say, Lilly) acquires a pharmacy benefit manager, PCS,  it might be able use 
PCS information about rival pharma prices to coordinate at manufacturer level by deterring cheating.  
• Eliminating/Disadvantaging a Disruptive Buyer
• In 2010, if Amazon was a disruptive buyer of books and thereby preventing publisher coordination, its 
incentives might change if it acquired a large publisher.
• Eliminating/Disadvantaging an Upstream Maverick
• In 2010, if (say) Prentice Hall were a maverick in selling hardcover books to brick-and-mortar stores and 
thereby preventing publisher coordination, its incentives might change if it were acquired by Amazon.
• Eliminating/Disadvantaging a Downstream Maverick
• Suppose that a downstream soft drink company (e.g., Dr. Pepper/7UP) is preventing downstream 
coordination by Coke and Pepsi.   A vertical merger by which Coke and Pepsi acquires Bottlers can lead 
the Bottlers to raise price to the maverick to facilitate downstream coordination.
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Evaluating Merger-Specific Efficiencies:
Some Probative Questions
• Did the merging parties attempt to achieve efficiencies by contract? 
• If there were no attempts, why no attempts? 
• If there were attempts, why did the negotiations fail?
• What specific contracting impediments existed?
• How will the merger eliminate these impediments
• Could the efficiencies have been at least partially achieved by contract?
• Will the post-merger firm face any impediments to achieving the efficiencies? 
• Will the post-merger firm have opportunity costs that would lead them to avoid passing through the benefits to consumers?
• Is achieving these efficiencies inextricably linked to denying the efficiency benefits to rivals? 
• Will the merged firm have the incentive to deny the efficiency benefits to rivals?
• Do other unintegrated firms in this or similar industries achieve some or all of the claimed efficiencies by contract?
• Do other integrated firms achieve the claimed efficiencies?
• How large are the efficiency benefits?
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Appendix B: 
AT&T/Time Warner 
Suggested Drafting Issues
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AT&T Case Indicates Some Bargaining 
Leverage Theory Issues to Explain in VMG
• District court opinion in AT&T/Time Warner merger was confused about 
important several economic issues:
• Will separate divisions of integrated firms attempt to maximize total 
corporate profits?
• Is the Nash bargaining model premised on frequent or permanent 
blackouts?
• In exclusion cases, does the self-interest of foreclosed competitors 
inherently conflict with consumer interests?
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Joint Profit Maximization
• Judge Leon was skeptical that Time Warner would take benefits to AT&T into account in 
bargaining with AT&T’s competitors, leading him to reject applicability of Nash bargaining 
model.
• That skepticism is economic and legal error:
• Contrary to Copperweld, which conclusively presumes that divisions of integrated firm act 
to maximize joint profits.
• Rejecting this presumption would permit Coke and Pepsi to justify merger on the grounds 
that each division would be instructed to maximize division profits, not overall corporate 
profits.
• Illogical in that taking AT&T interests into account actually will lead to Time Warner 
obtaining higher negotiated prices and higher profits, not lower (i.e., unlike total 
foreclosure where there is profit-sacrifice).
• Note: EDM also is based on joint profit-maximization, so illogical to assume EDM while 
rejecting Nash bargaining model.
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Nash Bargaining Equilibrium 
and Permanent Blackouts
• Judge Leon was skeptical of the Nash Bargaining model because …
• Blackouts were rare.
• Permanent blackouts would be “catastrophic” for the video content firm 
(e.g., TW). 
• But, blackouts are not inherent in Nash model.
• Assumption is that agreements will be reached before any blackout occurs 
precisely because blackouts are costly, or even catastrophic.
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Competitor Testimony
• Judge Leon was skeptical of testimony of AT&T’s distribution competitors about Time 
Warner’s increased bargaining leverage from the merger.
• This skepticism corresponds to the view that in horizontal mergers, competitor complaints 
suggest that merger must be procompetitive.
• That inference fails in vertical mergers where competitors are foreclosed:
• The competitors are also customers.
• If their costs are raised, that fact leads to a likelihood that prices will be raised to the customers of the 
downstream firms, the relevant “consumers” in such cases.  
• This analysis suggests that the competitor/customers testimony is less likely to conflict with consumer interests.
• Judge Leon also did not apply such skepticism to the testimony of AT&T executives, who 
would gain from an anticompetitive merger.
• Nor was he so skeptical of testimony by Time Warner top executives, who would achieve a windfall from 
consummation of the merger.
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